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ing, the circuit court concluded that the
high-pressure sales tactics, rather than
the notices themselves, caused the resi-
dents to purchase memberships. The
court vacated the entire order. The
Division appealed the circuit court rul-
ing to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland.
Illegal Solicitations Subject to
Regulation
The appellate court found the no-
tices misleading and consequently ana-
lyzed whether the Division could regu-
late them. Since most of the false and
misleading conduct transpired outside
Maryland, the court questioned the
state's ability to control the notices.
The court also considered to what ex-
tent the Division could regulate the
out-of-state conduct that made the so-
licitations defective.
OWC argued that the regulations
were invalid if they affected out-of-
state conduct because Maryland lacked
the power to control conduct occurring
within other states. The court dis-
agreed, holding that the Division could
regulate any notices sent to Maryland
residents which violated the Act, even
if those notices originated out-of-state.
After finding the notices misleading,
the court held that the Division could
regulate them.
Although the Division could regu-
late the communications sent into Mary-
land, the court opined that any attempt
to control the sales promotion efforts
or the redemption scheme, both of
which occurred entirely outside of
Maryland, was an impermissible intru-
sion on out-of-state conduct.
Restitution Allowed to Extent
Consumer Relied on Notice
The Division argued that the Act
allowed restitution for consumers' dam-
ages which occurred "in connection
with" a violation of the Act, and that
OWC's sales activities were "in con-
nection with" such illegal solicitations.
Therefore, the Division wanted the
court to order OWC to pay restitution
for the entire transaction in each case.
The court, however, rejected this argu-
ment. The court relied on Consumer
Protection v. Consumer Publishing,
501 A.2d 48 (Md. 1985), which held
that while proof of actual reliance was
not necessary to justify a general resti-
tution provision, actual restitution could
be ordered only for consumers who
stated that they were deceived by and
relied on the offending communica-
tions.
The appellate court stated that since
the notice here made no mention of
campsites or memberships there was a
very remote possibility that a Maryland
resident purchased a campsite mem-
bership in reliance on the solicitation.
The court thus concluded that the sales
tactics were not sufficiently "in con-
nection with" the notices and conse-
quently precluded restitution for the
purchases.
However, despite refusing to order
restitution for the membership pur-
chases, the court determined that some
relief could be ordered. The court held
that the Division could require OWC to
refund an amount equal to the cost of
the trip to Marylanders who claimed
that, without ultimately purchasing a
membership, they visited OWC camp-
grounds in reliance on a notice which
violated the Act. Marylanders who did
purchase a campground membership,
however, would not be eligible for this
refund. The court also held that the
Division could order OWC: (1) to re-
fund all redemption fees charged to
obtain the prizes, or (2) to pay the value
of prizes to those persons currently
holding certificates of redemption who
OWC also misled into thinking the
prizes would be awarded uncondition-
ally upon their arrival at the campsites.
Lower Court Order too Far-reaching
The appellate court thus held that
the lower court erred in striking the
Division's entire administrative order
because Maryland could regulate com-
munications, such as OWC notices,
which violated the Act. However, the
court upheld the earlier dismissal of the
order attempting to regulate practices
that occurred completely outside Mary-
land. Finally, the court concluded that
OWC could be ordered to refund travel
costs and redemption fees to those resi-
dents who relied on the notices in
travelling but who did not purchase
campground memberships. 4-
- Peter McNamara
Attorneys Must Disclose
Potential Conflicts of
Interest in Multi-Party
Representation
In Eriks v. Denver, 824 P.2d 1207
(Wash. 1992), the Washington Supreme
Court held that attorneys must disclose
potential conflicts of interest between
clients they represent to avoid violating
the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity ("Code"). The court also found that
a breach of professional responsibility
may require an attorney to reimburse
clients for fees paid, plus prejudgment
interest.
Attorney Represents Both Investors
and Promoters
In 1977, Cliff Johnson, Percy
Goodwin, and others ("promoters")
sold tax shelter investments in master
sound recordings. By 1981, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service ("IRS") chal-
lenged various tax credits and de-
ductions taken by the investors of the
tax shelters. These challenges to the tax
shelter caused the promoters to create
the Master Recording Trust Fund
("Fund"), a joint legal defense fund for
promoters and investors who contrib-
uted to the fund. The promoters then
hired attorney William Denver ("Den-
ver") to represent all the members of
the fund.
Prior to undertaking the joint repre-
sentation of the Fund contributors, Den-
ver knew that the IRS might disallow
the investors' tax credits and deduc-
tions. Furthermore, he realized that if
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the IRS denied the investors' tax claims,
the investors might have potential legal
claims against the promoters causing a
conflict of interest. The conflict would
arise because Denver would simulta-
neously represent the investors and pro-
moters, who would have different in-
terests. Consequently, Denver discussed
the potential conflicts with the promot-
ers; however, he failed to disclose any
such information to the investors.
In 1983, a tax court hearing revealed
extensive problems with the master
sound recording appraisals and titles.
Nonetheless, Denver continued to rep-
resent the Fund investor members, with-
out advising them of their rights with
respect to the promoters. Furthermore,
Denver, after being asked by the inves-
tors, declined to advise them of their
legal recourse available against the pro-
moters. Instead, Denver recommended
that the investors settle with the IRS
and seek independent legal counsel if
they decided to pursue claims against
the promoters.
Court Finds Conflict of Interest
The Fund investors filed a class
action suit against Denver, alleging
negligent representation, violation of
the Code, and liability under the Con-
sumer Protection Act ("CPA") for un-
fair and deceptive practices. The trial
court granted the investors' class sta-
tus, and then bifurcated the trial into
two phases. The first phase addressed
issues common to all parties. The
second phase dealt with individual
claims of negligence and malpractice.
The trial court granted partial sum-
mary judgment to the investors, ruling
that an actual conflict of interest ex-
isted in Denver's simultaneous repre-
sentation of the promoters and inves-
tors. The trial court concluded that
Denver violated Code Disciplinary Rule
5-105, thereby breaching his fiduciary
duty to the investor clients. The court
then ordered Denver to reimburse the
investors for contributions paid to the
trust fund, including prejudgment in-
terest.
The trial court, however, denied the
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investors' motion for summary judg-
ment to declare Denver's acts violative
of the CPA. The court also rejected the
investors' request for treble damages
under the CPA, finding such relief
inappropriate.
The court of appeals subsequently
certified the case, and the Supreme
Court of Washington granted review of
the trial court's rulings.
Denver Violated the Code
The court found that whether an
attorney's actions violate the Code re-
garding the duty to notify clients of
potential conflict of interest was a ques-
tion of law. As a result, the court
rejected Denver's argument that sum-
mary judgment was improper since
expert affidavits supported his position
and created a factual issue. The court
reasoned that the trial court was not
obligated to consider affidavits, which
contained mere conclusions of law, not
fact. Thus, the trial court properly
disregarded the affidavits and consid-
ered provisions of the Code in deter-
mining whether an actual conflict of
interest existed.
In judging whether Denver violated
the Code as a matter of law, the court
looked to Code Disciplinary Rules 5-
105(A) and (B), which required an
attorney to decline or discontinue em-
ployment where it was certain or likely
that such representation would ad-
versely affect a client. The Code,
however, allowed an exception to the
general ban on multiple representation
if two requirements were met: (1) where
it was obvious that the attorney could
adequately represent all parties; and (2)
where all clients were made aware of
the risk of conflict. The court analyzed
Denver's conduct in light of these ex-
ceptions.
The court relied on the Ethical Con-
siderations of the Code in concluding
that Denver violated the Code. The
court stated that Denver's situation rep-
resented precisely the type of miscon-
duct that the rules sought to prevent.
Furthermore, Denver forced his clients
to seek alternative counsel due to his
inability to provide adequate represen-
tation. Citing the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, the court noted
that Denver breached a duty of loyalty
to his clients because he was unable to
properly serve their needs.
The court interpreted the Code
broadly, reasoning that its purpose was
to protect the public from attorney
misconduct and potential harm from
multiple representation that incorpo-
rates conflicting interests. The Ethical
Considerations expressly state that
multiple representation is not favored
if a potential conflict of interest exists.
The court also emphasized the impor-
tance of affording clients an opportu-
nity to independently evaluate their
need for representation. The court
stated that to achieve this goal, attor-
neys must respect their client's right to
be notified of potential risks. In
Denver's case, the investors were never
afforded the opportunity to decide
whether Denver would serve their
needs. This arose from Denver's fail-
ure to discuss potential difficulties with
them.
A Breach of Professional Ethics
Warrants Reimbursement of Fees
The Supreme Court of Washington
determined that the trial court's order
compelling Denver to reimburse the
investor members of the Fund was
appropriate because he violated the
Code and committed breach of fidu-
ciary duty. The court rejected Denver's
argument that the plaintiffs had to prove
causation and damage. The court stated
that those were elements of a malprac-
tice suit and were inapplicable in this
action. Furthernore, the court deter-
mined that repayment of fees was a
reasonable means to redress injury re-
sulting from breaches of professional
responsibility.
Applicability of Consumer
Protection Act is a Question of Fact
The Supreme Court of Washington
affirmed the trial court's denial of the
plaintiffs' motion for summary judg-
ment requesting a declaration that Den-
ver violated the CPA as a matter of law.
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The court determined that in order to
prove a violation of the CPA, the inves-
tors had to prove that the Denver's act
(1) was unfair or deceptive, (2) oc-
curred in the conduct of trade or com-
merce, (3) affected the public interest,
and (4) caused injury to the plaintiff in
his or her business or property. Hang-
man Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v.
Safeco Title Ins. Co., 796 P.2d 531
(Wash. 1986). To establish that mis-
conduct occurred in commerce or trade,
the investors had to demonstrate that
the legal services in question related to
"entrepreneurial aspects" of the prac-
tice of law.
The investors argued that if Denver
had not concealed his potential conflict
of interest, they would not have em-
ployed him. The investors contended
that this deceptive practice constituted
part of the "entrepreneurial aspect" of
Denver's practice because he was able
to secure them as paying clients.
The court did not agree with the
investors' argument because a material
issue of fact existed as to whether
Denver acted for the purpose of in-
creasing profits or gaining clients. The
court therefore reasoned that the inves-
tors did not prove Denver's intent to
conceal the risk of conflict in order to
further his personal entrepreneurial in-
terests.
Finally, the court rejected the inves-
tors' claim that the trial court erred in
refusing to award treble reimburse-
ment damages or attorney's fees. The
court reasoned that the question of
Denver's liability under the CPA re-
mained unresolved, and thus damage
awards were premature. However, the
court speculated that even if a CPA
violation was found, the trial court had
complete discretion to decide whether
to award attorney's fees. Furthermore,
the trial court's decision on this issue
would not be overturned absent a mani-
fest abuse of discretion.
Dissent Rejects Conflict of Interest
Disclosure Requirement
In his dissent, Justice Johnson main-
tained that the CPR encompassed situ-
ations where conflicts of interest were
likely, not merely possible. He rea-
soned that since there was a factual
issue concerning Denver's failure to
disclose a likely conflict of interest, the
conclusion that Denver violated the
CPR was unfounded. Furthermore,
Johnson argued that the majority's hold-
ing placed an unreasonable burden on
attorneys because there were potential
conflicts of interest in almost every
case of multiple representation, and an
attorney cannot foresee every conceiv-
able situation.
Dissent Advocates Mandatory Award
of Attorney's Fees
Justice Johnson also dissented with
respect to the scope of the trial court's
discretion in awarding attorney's fees
under the CPA. He maintained that
since the statute mandates attorney's
fees, the trial court only had discretion
in the amount of the fees. oo
- Jean Prendergast
Consumer Protection Act
Applies to Business
Purchase of a Sign
In Sign-O-Lite Signs, Inc. v.
DeLaurenti Florist, Inc., 825 P.2d
714 (Wash. 1992), the Washington
Court of Appeals held that the Con-
sumer Protection Act ("CPA") applied
to the purchase of a sign. Additionally,
the court held that in the CPA viola-
tion, the lower court properly awarded
attorney's fees to the consumer.
Sign on the Dotted Line
Ann DeLaurenti ("DeLaurenti")
owned and operated DeLaurenti Flo-
rists, Inc., a floral shop located in a
shopping plaza. In April 1986,
DeLaurenti learned that the plaza had
adopted a policy that required all shops
in the plaza to advertise with
Channelume signs. Realizing that her
current wooden sign was unfit,
DeLaurenti sought bids and estimates
from various sign manufacturers for
the cost of a Channelume sign.
Chuck Kelly was a representative of
Sign-O-Lite Signs, Inc. ("Sign"), a
manufacturer of custom Channelume
signs. When Kelly learned of
DeLaurenti's interest in buying a sign,
he solicited DeLaurenti at her floral
shop and offered to submit a bid.
DeLaurenti agreed, and consequently
Kelly later called DeLaurenti and quoted
her a six year lease for a sign at $91.04
per month, or a purchase price for the
sign of $2,901.60. Sign's bid for the
sign was lower than any other company
that DeLaurenti contacted, and there-
fore, she accepted Sign's offer.
Subsequently, Kelly visited
DeLaurenti' s floral shop and presented
her with a document that he wanted her
to sign. Before signing the document,
DeLaurenti informed Kelly that she
did not have her reading glasses present.
However, Kelly assured her that the
document only authorized Sign to be-
gin work; DeLaurenti signed the docu-
ment. DeLaurenti did not see Kelly
write anything on the documents while
he was at the store.
Kelly failed to provide DeLaurenti
with a copy of the signed document or
any other description of the terms of
the purchase. Instead, DeLaurenti re-
lied solely on the representations that
Kelly extended particularly to her, the
$91.04 per month lease charge and the
$2,901.60 total purchase price for the
sign.
Later, Sign sent DeLaurenti an in-
voice for $297.42 per month for the
lease of the sign. Since this price was
over three times the rate Kelly quoted
her, DeLaurenti refused to pay the
invoice. DeLaurenti later demanded
copies of the documents that she signed.
When she received the copies,
DeLaurenti noticed that the lease charge
of $297.42 per month was written on a
line in the document. Realizing that the
agreement was not anything that she
bargained for, DeLaurenti refused to
60 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
I Recent Cases I
